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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20150154-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Appellant is incarcerated
SANTIAGO APONTE,

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Because this is an appeal in a criminal case not involving a first degree or capital
felony, this Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e).

ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1:

Did the trial court err in denying Santiago Aponte's motion to suppress

witness identification evidence that was the product of suggestion?

PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved below by Aponte's motion and his
renewed objection to this evidence at trial. See, e.g., R:45-50; R328:88.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: In evaluating a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress eyewitness identification evidence, this court reviews factual findings for
clear error and legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Gurule, 856 P.2d 377

(Utah App. 1993). If this Court concludes that the evidence was improperly
admitted, the State bears the burden of proving its admission was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ,J16. That analysis requires
this Court to consider "the importance of the witness[ es'] testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness[es] on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of

@

course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d
419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court err in admitting 404(b) evidence?
PRESERVATION: This issue was litigated and preserved below. R:187-191;

R:218-19; R327:14-16.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior

bad acts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, "but the evidence must be
scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that discretion."

@

State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,Jl3, 296 P.3d 673 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In September 2013, Aponte was charged by Information with Theft by Receiving
Stolen Property, a second degree felony; Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, a
third degree felony; Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a class B misdemeanor;
2
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Reckless Driving, a class B misdemeanor; Failure to Stop at Injury Accident, a class A
misdemeanor, and Driving on Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, a class C
misdemeanor. R:1-3. These charges were later amended such that the felony theft by
receiving charge was dismissed. R:7-9; R329:256. 1
After the preliminary hearing the trial court found sufficient probable cause to
bind all of the charges over for trial. R:36-39; R324:26. Aponte filed a Motion to
~

Suppress Eyewitness Identification evidence on the ground that that evidence was the
product of suggestion and thus was unreliable because the responding officer showed
only Aponte's photo to eyewitnesses on the night of the incident. R45-54.
Ten months after the crime, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress. R:45-52. Just prior to this hearing, the State attempted to remedy the
tainted initial identification by showing two eyewitnesses a photo lineup of six
individuals, including Aponte. Id. In response, Aponte filed a Supplemental Motion to
Suppress Eyewitness Identification, arguing that the initial taint was irreparable and the
State's remedial effort to correct the tainted identifications was also impermissibly
suggestive. R:54-59. On September 4, 2014, the trial court issued it Ruling and Order on
Motion to .Suppress Eyewitness Identification, wherein it denied Aponte's motion and

Before trial, the State dropped the second degree felony charge for theft by receiving
and the charges were presented to the jury as follows: Count I, failure to respond to an
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; Count II, reckless driving, a class B
misdemeanor; Count III, failure to stop after injury/accident, a class A misdemeanor;
Count IV, driving on a suspended or revoked license, a class C misdemeanor; and Count
V, theft by receiving stolen property, a class B misdemeanor. R329:256
1
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3

allowed the eyewitness identification evidence to be presented to the jury. R:96-102;
Addendum A; see also, R:222-29, State's Motion in Limine to allow eyewitnesses Miller
and Smith to testify.
Prior to trial, the State filed notice of its intent to admit 404(b) evidence involving
two other cases when Aponte fled from police. R:114-121. Aponte objected to the
motion on the ground that the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative
value. R:187-191. After oral argument the court granted the State's motion for the
limited purposes of showing intent, absence of mistake or accident, and showing identity
"because it shows that what the witnesses observed was something that this person would
not do by accident." R:218-19; R327:14•16. The limitingjury instruction given stated in
pertinent part, "You may only consider this evidence, if at all, for the limited purposes of
absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, opportunity, and the doctrine of chances."
R:264. However, the jury was not instructed on the meanings of these limited purposes
or how to apply them. Further, the only contested issue in this case was identity.
Trial was conducted on December 17-18, 2014. R:230-31; 288-89; 328, 329.
Because Aponte had notice of the proceeding yet failed to appear, the trial court found
that he had "voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be at trial(.]" R328:85.
The trial proceeded in absentia over Aponte's counsel's objection. Id. The jury found

@

Aponte guilty on all counts except Theft by Receiving Stolen Property. R:290-291;
R329:256. Aponte failed to appear at his sentencing and the court issued a nonbailable
warrant for his arrest. R:311-12, 330. Aponte was sentenced in absentia to the Utah
4
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State Prison for an indeterminate tenn not to exceed five years, based on his felony
conviction for Failure to Stop or Respond at Command of Police, with the maximum
allowable terms for his misdemeanor convictions to run concurrent. R:306, 330.
Aponte timely filed a Notice of Appeal. R:314.
STATEMENT OF FACTS MATERIAL TO THIS APPEAL

On August 31, 2013, Sergeant Todd Huff of the American Fork Police Department
@

terminated pursuit of a stolen silver Chevy Impala after losing sight of it in the vicinity of
State Street in American Fork. R324:4-8, 15; R328:105, 140. A few minutes later, a
passing motorist told Huff that the fleeing vehicle crashed at a nearby Hart's gas station.
R324:8, 20; R328:134-35, 141, 143. When Huff arrived at the station, witnesses informed
him that the Chevy's driver had jumped out the driver's side window and fled on foot.
R324:9. However a female passenger, Rebecca Robertson, was still at the "chaotic"
scene. R324:9, 13; R328: 143-44. Several witnesses, the gas station owners, and police
were "coming and going." R324: 13. Huff testified he ''was on the radio constantly" such
that he neglected to have "Karen" Smith2 sign her witness statement. R324:1 l-13.
Robertson told Huff that the driver was the defendant, Santiago Aponte. R324:9,
20. Another officer sent Huff a large electronic color copy of Aponte's photograph,

Ci

which he accessed on his laptop computer and showed to witnesses, asking them "if this
was the one they [had] seen run from the vehicle." R324:9, 18; R328:147; R328:157,

@

2

The witness was actually a Mr. Warren Smith who testified at the hearing on the motion
to suppress eyewitness identification. See, infra.
5

196. Two eyewitnesses, Eileen Miller and Warren Smith, both viewed the "fairly large"
"paper size" computer image of Aponte. R324:9-10, 19; R325:12, 16-17, 28; R328:179,
191. Miller testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the computer image of
Aponte "seemed to be the gentlemen" she had seen. R325:13; see also R328:175 (at trial
Miller testified, "[ ... ] I observed from where I was standing the picture on the screen in
the squad car, and I noticed that the picture that was up on the screen was the gentleman
that just ran in front of me."). Smith later testified that he "got a really good look at" the

@

suspect and was "highly confident" he was the same man that Sergeant Huff showed him
in the photo. R325:38-9; R328:191.

Smith noted that the photo from the computer

image "was just a little bit different" than the man he saw, but he knew it was the same
individual. R328:196. No other photos were shown to any of the witnesses at that time.
R324:18, 37. Huff testified that in a case like this it is "standard procedure" to show
witnesses only the suspect's photo. R328:155.
Several months later and prior to a June 9, 2014 hearing on Aponte's motion to
suppress the eyewitness identification evidence, Huff showed eyewitnesses Miller and
Smith a photo lineup of six individuals including Aponte.

R325:19-20, 29, 37;

R328:160-61, 181, 192-93; State's Exhibits 5 & 6. He "prefaced [ ... ] showing the lineup
by saying, 'I have a lineup with whoever the driver was of that vehicle in the lineup. Can

~

you look at it and tell me if you recognize the driver of the vehicle in the lineup."'
R328: 164. Thus he let the witnesses know that the lineup contained a photo of the person
who he "believed was the driver." R328:164-65, 182.
6
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Miller "immediately" identified Aponte's photograph with 99 percent certainty
after taking "a long look at it", placing a sticky note on his head in lieu of the blue
bandana the suspect wore at the time of the crime, and engaging in a "process of
elimination to make doubly sure[.]"

R325:20-1.

Miller testified that the accident

happened 20-25 feet in front of her; and because the crashed vehicle was "spewing
smoke[,]" her "first thought was "we're going to have a fire" and that the occupants
@

might be injured. R328: 171. She watched the driver struggle with the airbag,
communicate with the passenger, unroll and crawl out the car window, run behind the
building where he scaled an eight-foot fence, then slide down a trailer parked on the other
side. R325:6-7; R328:169-173. She said he was about five feet away when he ran past
her. R328: 173. Miller pursued the suspect when she realized he was running from the
scene. R328: 172. She testified the suspect wore a blue bandana on his head; and that
after he jumped out of the car window he looked scared and also gave her a look as if to
warn her off. R325:7-9; R328:173, 179. Miller believed she observed the suspect for
approximately three minutes from the time of impact until he scaled the fence. R325:9.
Her recollection that another eyewitness, Warren Smith, was the driver of a red
Oldsmobile at the scene was inaccurate, as Smith was actually the passenger, not the

~

driver. R328:170-71, 186.
Smith also identified Aponte in the June 9, 2014 lineup as the suspect, with a
reported 99 percent certainty. R325:29-30. However, between being shown the first

@

photo of Aponte at the scene and being presented with the photo lineup several months
7

later, Smith looked Aponte up on the internet. R328:197. Smith stated that in both the
photo lineup and the computer image he was shown on the night of the incident the
suspect had a shaved head, "although that wasn't [... ] significant. It was his eyes, his
mouth, his - just his overall facial features that made it really easy." R325:34. Smith
testified that he was a passenger in a vehicle that suffered a minor impact during the
crash. R325:23; R328:187, 191. He also saw the suspect driver struggle with the airbag
then jump from the driver's side window. R325:24; R328:189-190. The suspect wore a
blue bandana and made eye contact with Smith before running behind the station and
scaling the fence. R325 :25. Smith testified that he observed the suspect "very, very
clear" for perhaps five to ten seconds before he fled the scene. R325:27-8, 33; R328:194.
However, Smith's immediate concern was some "steam or smoke" coming from the
crashed stolen vehicle and whether there might be a fire. R325:35.
Both Miller and Smith testified that the accident happened around 9:30 p.m. when
it was dark but the area around the gas pumps was well lit. R325:10, 27-8; R328:169l 70, 185.
Rebecca Robertson was uncooperative with police; and an officer noted in his
report that she was unwilling to tell him the truth because she "was covering" for
someone else. R328:l 18-19. She was also in possession of "a prescription pill" and was

@

under the influence of a narcotic at the time of the accident. R328:119, 126. Robertson
testified at trial that Aponte was the driver of the stolen vehicle. R328:121-22, 146. She
testified she pled guilty to charges arising from the case and had four prior felony
8
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convictions.

R328: 123-24.

Robertson also had a prior conviction for giving false

@

information to a police officer. R328: 126. She testified, "You don't tell on your friends.
You have a loyal code, your friends." R328:127. When asked on cross-examination if
she would lie to protect a friend, she responded, "Back in the day, yeah, I probably
would, you know. I got pretty messed up in - [.]" R328:128. On redirect she stated that
her testimony was truthful. R328-: 128.
Aponte moved to suppress. the eyewitness identifications of both Miller and Smith
on the ground that that evidence was the product of suggestion and violated his right to
due process.

R326:2-4.

The trial court denied Aponte's motion, finding that the

eyewitness identification evidence was reliable under the five factors set forth in State v.

Long, 781 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986), infra. R96-102. The court specifically found that
showing the eyewitnesses a single photograph of the defendant did not create "an
unconstitutional risk of taint" because police needed to identify the suspect quickly as he
had fled the scene. "The on-scene identification was characterized by non-ambiguity and
strength of the identification." R99.
Additional material facts will be cited herein as warranted.

9

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE, INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT
THE SUGGESTIVE AND THUS UNRELIABLE EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION
PROCESS
WAS
JUSTIFIED
BY
POLICE
EXPEDIENCY.
In its Ruling and Order on Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification (R:96-

102; Addendum A), the trial court concluded that the initial photo identification of
Aponte, where only his photo was shown to eyewitnesses, presented no "unconstitutional

@

risk of taint" based on the totality of circumstances. R:99. Relying upon and quoting
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968), the court concluded that Sergeant

Hufrs action of showing only Aponte's photograph to witnesses was "necessary and did

~

not violate defendant's rights to due process" because Huff had "no time to prepare a
photo lineup" and the suspect was "at large and fleeing." R:99. "The Constitution surely
did not contemplate putting the public at physical risk[ ... ] as Simmons confirms." R:99.
Therefore, the trial court dismissed any risk of misidentification and unreliability created
by the suggestive presentation on the ground of police expediency. The court further
determined that based on its analysis, Aponte's claim that "the initial photo identification
tainted the subsequent photo lineup" was "largely render[ed] moot[.]" R:99.
The trial court's conclusion that under Simmons, police expediency allows a
suggestive identification process is incorrect. Moreover, it runs counter to the more
stringent standards created and applied by Utah appellate courts.

10
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The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution provides, "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... without due process of law."
U.S. Const., Amend. V. This provision requires that eyewitness identification evidence
must be sufficiently reliable before it can be admitted into evidence. Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972); see also, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967)
(discussing whether an eyewitness confrontation was "so unnecessarily suggestive and
i9

conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [defendant] was denied due process
of law").
Reliability is "the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony[.]" Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). Therefore, trial courts
must perform a gatekeeping function in keeping unreliable evidence from a jury.
"Although research has convincingly demonstrated weaknesses inherent in eyewitness

~

identification, jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. People do not
accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the
accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness.

Moreover, common

knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to documented research findings."

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,490 (Utah 1986).
i)

Here, the trial court failed in its gatekeeping role. Neither the facts nor the Court's
analysis in Simmons support the trial court's findings and conclusions in this case. In

Simmons, the factual context involved two unmasked gunman who robbed a bank then
@

fled the scene. Though the Court's analysis briefly noted the necessity of identifying and
11

apprehending the suspects who were still at large when eyewitnesses were shown
photographs of Simmons and the codefendant, the Court's ultimate focus was on the
reliability of that identification process based on the totality of the circumstances in that
case:
[T]here was in the circumstances of this case little chance that the procedure
utilized led to misidentification of Simmons. The robbery took place in the
afternoon in a well lighted bank. The robbers wore no masks. Five bank employees
had been able to see the robber later identified as Simmons for periods ranging up
to five minutes. Those witnesses were shown the photographs only a day later,
while their memories were still fresh. At least six photographs were displayed to
each witness. Apparently, these consisted primarily of group photographs, with
Simmons and Andrews each appearing several times in the series. Each witness
was alone when he or she saw the photographs. There is no evidence to indicate
that the witnesses were told anything about the progress of the investigation, or
that the FBI agents in any other way suggested which persons in the pictures were
under suspicion.
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385 (emphasis added).

These facts do not support the trial court's findings and conclusions in this case.
Here and contrary to the circumstances in Simmons, witnesses were shown only one
photograph of Aponte, then asked "if this was the one they [had] seen run from the
vehicle." R324:9, 18; R328:147; R328:157, 196. The witnesses were milling around the
chaotic scene and at some point - or several - grouped around Hufrs police car where
the "fairly large" image of Aponte was displayed on Huffs laptop computer. R324:9-10,
19; R325:12, 16-17, 28; R328:179. The witnesses clearly understood that police believed
the individual in the single photograph shown to them was the driver of the stolen vehicle
and he was presented to them as such.

R328:155. This process was impermissibly
12
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suggestive.

Indeed, the proper application of Simmons on these facts would have

required the exclusion of the tainted eyewitness identification evidence in this case:
It must be recognized that improper employment of photographs by police may
sometimes cause witnesses to err in identifying criminals. A witness may have
obtained only a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen him under poor
conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow the most correct photographic
identification procedures and show him the pictures of a number of individuals
without indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that the witness may
make an incorrect identification. This danger will be increased if the police
display to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally
resembles the person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons
among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in some way
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also heightened if the police
indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the persons
pictured committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial misidentification
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the
photograph, rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness
ofsubsequent lineup or courtroom identification.

Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383-84 (emphasis added). The trial court's analysis of Simmons
€iP

was incorrect as that case requires that a conviction based on eyewitness identification
following an impermissibly suggestive photographic identification procedure, such as
that utilized in this case, be set aside. Id.
Moreover, because showing the eyewitnesses only Aponte' s photograph while
asking them if he was the driver was impermissibly suggestive, that identification process
gave "rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" that would
taint any future identifications. State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). But
aside from this irreparable taint created by the initial and impermissibly suggestive
identification, the subsequent photo lineup was also impermissibly suggestive because

13

the witnesses were again told that Sergeant Huff believed the array of six photos shown
to them at that time included the suspect. R325:19-20, 29, 37; R328:160-61, 164-65,
181-82, 192-93; see also, State's Exhibits 5 & 6.
Indeed, the identification procedures utilized here provide a textbook case of
everything law enforcement should not do when gathering eyewitness identification
evidence. "The words and actions of law enforcement officials who present the photos
should convey an attitude of disinterest, and the photographs themselves should not be

@

selected so as to give greater prominence to one photograph. [ ... ] Any manipulation
indicating that the police believe one of the photographs portrays the accused could lead
to a finding of suggestiveness." Id. Added to the impermissible suggestiveness of these
procedures is the fact that in the interim, eyewitness Warren Smith unilaterally went to
the trouble of locating Aponte's image on the internet, further solidifying his
identification of Aponte's photograph at the crime scene. The trial court did not address
these material facts in its ruling. See, State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994)
("Subsequent identification must be based on [an] untainted, independent foundation to
be reliable") (citation omitted).
As noted above, Utah appellate courts apply an even more stringent standard to
ensure that eyewitness identification evidence is reliable before it can be presented to a

Ci

jury. With jurisprudence dating at least as far back as 1986, the Utah Supreme Court
explained the scientific research demonstrating that despite the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identifications, juries are unaware of these problems and place great weight
14
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on this evidence. State v. Long, 721 P .2d at 490. A few years after Long, in State v.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Court further developed and clarified the.nonexhaustive five-part analysis that currently applies to this evidence. Id. at 781 (analyzing
reliability of eyewitness identification evidence based on ( 1) the opportunity to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor; (3) the witness's
capacity to observe; (4) whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and
@

remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of suggestion; and ( 5) the
nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive and
remember it correctly, which perception may be adversely affected if the observer's race
is different from the race of the actor); see also, State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d
953, 963, 965 (noting that when acting as a gatekeeper and determining whether out-ofcourt identification violates due process and should be excluded, a court must "examine
the procedural actions taken by law enforcement officials in assembling and presenting a
photo array to witnesses"; and "make a preliminary determination on whether the
identification is sufficiently reliable such that its admission and consideration by the jury
will not violate defendant's right to due process.").
The Utah Supreme Court revisited the issue in 2009 in State v. Clopten wherein it

i>

reiterated the problems associated with the false perception that eyewitness
identifications are reliable and even infallible. "[J]uries seem[] to be swayed the most by
the confidence of an eyewitness, even though such confidence correlates only weakly

@

with accuracy." 2009 UT 84, ifl5, 223 P.3d 1103. Moreover, cautionary instructions are
15

ineffective at educating the jury on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. Id. at

1123-24.
This Court recently applied Utah's more stringent standard in State v. Lujan, 2015
UT App 199, where the defendant's conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial because the trial court erroneously admitted unreliable eyewitness testimony.

Id. at 11. In Lujan, the eyewitness saw an Hispanic suspect at a very close range, because
the suspect stole the witness's car literally out from under him as the witness sat in the

®

driver's seat in his own driveway. A short time later Police apprehended Lujan at a
nearby school and brought the eyewitness to the scene to positively identify him - which
he proceeded to do, though Lujan was bald and had a goatee, unlike the witness's initial
description of the suspect. Id. at 114.
As this Court again explained, "[T]he scientific literature [ ... ] is replete with
empirical studies documenting the unreliability of eyewitness identification." Id. at ,Il 0
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And because jurors give eyewitness
testimony great weight and do not understand its fallibility, "Utah applies a more
stringent standard in making reliability determinations than that employed in the federal
system." Id. Moreover and contrary to the trial court's ruling in this case, this Court's
analysis in Lujan makes clear that the totality of circumstances test goes to the question
of reliability, not to police expediency, which exception would swallow the rule in any
event as police expediency could almost always be used to justify an impennissibly
suggestive identification. Id.
16
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Based on the applicable law, the trial court erroneously admitted the eyewitness
identification evidence in this case.

The improper and impermissibly suggestive

procedures employed ensured that the identification of Aponte was not spontaneous but
rather the product of suggestion. See, Id. at ,Ill.
Moreover, this error was harmful. Aside from the fact that juries are unaware of
the proven fallibility of an honest eyewitness's identification and therefore are more
G¼)

likely than not to give that evidence more weight than it warrants, the only other direct
evidence that Aponte was the suspect driver came from Rebecca Robertson, a long-term
drug user and felon with an extensive criminal history who was under the influence of
narcotics, had a history of lying to the police, and was untruthful with police in this case.
Therefore, "[w]hen [Miller's and Smith's] identifications of [Aponte] are removed, the
State's case is severely weakened." Id. at ,fl 7.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE 404(b) EVIDENCE
AND IN FAILING TO SCRUPULOUSLY EXAMINE IT TO ENSURE IT
WAS OFFERED FOR A PROPER NON-CHARACTER PURPOSE.
Over Aponte's objection, the State presented evidence of Aponte's two prior

convictions for evading for the express purposes of showing the absence of mistake, "the
doctrine of chances", and identity - expressly stating that the evidence would show that

i>

the eyewitnesses' identifications were correct. R:327:3, 6-7, 9-10, 12; see also, State's
Exhibits 7 & 8 (certified copies of prior convictions admitted into evidence). At oral
argument on the State's motion to allow this evidence, the prosecutor explained, "We

~

show identity because [the prior convictions] are similar in nature to [.. . the] prior
17

offenses[.] [ ... ]

That works with the doctrine of chances.

That's showing identity,

because if he's done this twice before, the law of probabilities would suggest, it's not an
accident." R327:10. The prosecution also argued that the evidence would show "a lack
of accident or mistake on the part of the witnesses" in identifying Aponte. R327: 12.
In granting the State's motion, the trial court concluded that under the language of
404(b), State v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), and State v. Verde, infra, the prior
bad act evidence was admissible to show intent, "in other words his intent was in leaving
the area."

R327:14-16.

~

It was also admissible "to show an absence of mistake or

accident, in that he wasn't just leaving because he didn't know better. It would also show
knowledge about what he was doing." R327:14.
The trial court initially had "a hard time [] making the bridge from prior similar
incidents to identity." R327: 14. However, the court ultimately concluded the evidence
was admissible "for purposes of showing identity, because it shows that what the
witnesses observed was something that this person would not do by accident." R327:16.
However and as noted in the Statement of the Case, supra, the limiting jury instruction

<i

did not address identity, stating in pertinent part, "You may only consider this evidence,
if at all, for the limited purposes of absence of mistake or accident, knowledge,
opportunity, and the doctrine of chances."

R:264.

The jury received no further

instruction on this evidence, no definitions for these limited purposes, and no meaningful
guidance on how to apply them to the facts. Incidentally and contrary to the State's
repeatedly expressed primary purpose, the evidence was not offered to prove identity.
18
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The trial court's analysis of the 404(b) evidence is incorrect, as was its decision to
allow it. "Under this rule, the admissibility of prior misconduct evidence depends on its
avowed purpose. When such evidence is offered to suggest action in conformity with a
person's alleged bad character, it is inadmissible under the rule. When past misconduct
evidence is offered for any other purpose, on the other hand, it is admissible." State v.

Verde, 2012 UT 60, 115.
~

As per the jury instruction given, the avowed purpose of the 404(b) evidence was
to establish (1) lack of mistake or accident; (2) knowledge; (3) opportunity; and (4) the
doctrine of chances. Aside from the fact that the jury was not apprised of the legal
meanings of these limited purposes, none are legitimate bases for admitting the prior bad
acts evidence under the facts of this case, as the only contested issue was the identity of
the suspect. That the driver of the stolen vehicle had the opportunity and knowledge of
what he was doing, and that he did not mistakenly or accidentally flee from police and
the crime scene, were not contested facts and are readily inferred from the evidence.
As the Verde court explained, where elements of a crime are "uncontested and
readily inferable from other evidence, 404(b) evidence is largely tangential and
duplicative. It is accordingly difficult to characterize its purpose as properly aimed at

i)

establishing [those elements]. In context, it seems much more likely that it was aimed at
sustaining an impermissible inference that [the defendant] acted in conformity with the
bad character suggested by his prior bad acts." Id. at 126. "Such evidence may be worse

@

than immaterial to a legitimate narrative. It may risk creating an alternative, illegitimate
19

narrative-that the defendant has a reprehensible character, that he probably acted in
conformity with it, and that he should be punished for his immoral character in any
event." Id. at 129.
As for the legal doctrine of chances, aside from the fact that the jury was never
instructed on what it was or how to apply it, the trial court also misunderstood the
doctrine, referring to the evidence admissible thereunder as '" good' propensity evidence
[ ... ] rather than 'bad' propensity evidence." R327:16. In other words, the trial court
misinterpreted Verde as allowing evidence showing that a defendant has the propensity or
bad character to commit the charged crime, which was the true purpose for the prior bad
act evidence offered in this case - to show that Aponte had a propensity to evade police.
Based on the foregoing facts and law, the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of Aponte's prior bad acts.

CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred in admitting tainted eyewitness identification evidence
and prior bad acts, Aponte's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a
new trial.
Submitted this 26th day of October, 2015.
JENNIFERK. GOWANS, P.C.
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Tab A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION TO

SUPPRESS EYEWITNESS
Plaintiff,

IDENTIFICATION

vs.
Case No. 141400333

SANTIAGO AVILA APONTE,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel D. McVey

Defendant moved to suppress evidence of eyewitness identifications from a single photo
and a photo lineup array. The parties submitted the matter on the evidence of the preliminary
hearing, supplemented by the actual photo array. The Court heard arguments of counsel and
reviewed their memoranda. Counsel submitted the matter for decision.
FACTS
On August 31, 2013, Sergeant Huff was attempting to stop a vehicle reported as stolen.
The vehicle accelerated and fled. A witness told Huff the vehicle had crashed at a local gas
station. Huff arrived at the station and saw the vehicle. The driver had fled the scene.

A passenger in the car remained and told Huff the driver was Defendant, Aponte. Huff
obtained a photo of a man named Aponte from public files and showed it to two witnesses at the
scene. Each witness identified defendant as the driver of the car from this photograph. Each

witness also reported getting a good, sustained look at the driver of the vehicle while he was
~

running away. They saw the photos shortly after witnessing the accident. Based on this positive
identification, and witness infonnation on where defendant was headed, police later apprehended
him.

About IO months later on June 9, 2014, Huff created a photo array of six individuals,
including defendant, and showed it to three witnesses, including the two who had identified his

photo at the scene. Those two witnesses identified defendant as the driver with "99%" certainty.
Another witness narrowed the list down to defendant (30% certainty) and another person's photo

(70% certainty).
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues each photo identification at the scene should be suppressed as
suggestive and, since showing the photos at the scene tainted the subsequent identification, and
all of the photo demonstrations would taint any further identification at trial, any eyewitness
identification should be suppressed. The Court addresses these points as a gatekeeper for
determining whether the identifications are sufficiently reliable and non-tainted to be presented to
the jury. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 30, 48 P.3d 953, 963. See also State v. Guzman, 2004
UT App 211, 118, 95 P.3d 302, 307.

A. IDENTIFICATION AT TRJAL
In State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 4f 30, 48 P.3d 953, 963, our Supreme Court stated:

Since State v. Long, 721 P .2d, 483 (Utah 1986) we have used five factors as a test
for analyzing, as a preliminary constitutional matter, whether an eyewitness
identification is sufficiently reliable to be presented to the jury. See, e.g., Hollen,
2002 UT 35, 1126-63; State v. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, 118, 20 P.3d 265 (quoting
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493)); State v. Decorso,
1999 UT 57,142,993 P.2d 837 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at493).The factors are
as follows:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness' degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the
witness' capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness' identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly.
Long, 781 P.2d at 493. ''While these factors provide guidance, the list is certainly not an

exhaustive or exclusive list of factors that may be considered in determining whether an
identification is reliable, and, therefore, not violative of due process." Hubbard, at 127-29.
also Guzman, at 118, 95 P.3d 302, 307.
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See
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In this case, the witness identifications at the crime scene satisfy these elements. There
seems to be no real dispute on this point. The witnesses each had a good look at the suspect,
being within 25 feet in an extremely well-lit area. One witness was within a half car length of the
suspect and the suspect looked right at him. They both saw him for a period of twenty to thirty
seconds or more, so it was not a quick glance. The witnesses actually focused on the suspect
with the expressed intent of making sure they could identify him in the future. Both witnesses
were very clear in their identification at the preliminary hearing and indicated they were likewise
mentally acute at the scene. They identified the suspect to the officer and were consistent in their
identification thereafter. The event was an unusual one, drawing attention to the suspect. Of
course, their identification was corroborated by the passenger in the stolen car who accompanied
defendant and was a good enough acquaintance to know his name.

B. THE INITIAL PHOTO IDENTIFICATION
The reasonableness of use of photos to obtain identification must be considered "in light
of the totality of the circumstances." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,383, 88 S.Ct. 967,
970 (1968). Further, in cases where police use a photograph in attempting to apprehend a
suspect after a crime, "despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure
has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement from the standpoint of both
apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing
eyewitnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs." Id. at 384.
Here, Officer Huff heard from an apparent acquaintance of defendant that defendant was
driving the stolen vehicle when it crashed, spectacularly the Court might add, at the gas station.
The driver may have risked a serious fire or explosion and bystander deaths by crashing at a high
speed in the area of the gas pumps. Huff was justified in trying to verify defendant was indeed
the driver and apprehend him as quickly as possible. Using all means at his disposal, and
verifying the fortunately obtained photo with the witnesses allowed him to do this. He was thus
able to avoid arresting an innocent suspect, and protect the public from similar acts by defendant
in the form of stealing another car in his flight and again putting the public at fatal risk. A person
such as defendant could avoid such a purported, but legally distorted, constitutional concern he
is now expressing by not leaving the scene of an accident. The law requires drivers in accidents
3

to stay at the scene.
Actually, the facts in this case are similar to those in Simmons, supra, where the suspect
fled the scene and was still at large, making it necessary for police to determine quickly whether
they were on the right track and looking for the right person. Officer Hufr s actions were
necessary and did not violate defendant's rights to due process which Defendant was actively
engaged in compromising by fleeing. Under defendant's theory, police could never show a
single photo to eyewitnesses in an attempt to solve a recently committed crime when time is of
the essence, and there is no time to prepare a photo lineup because the suspect is at large and
fleeing. The Constitution surely did not contemplate putting the public at physical risk in the
manner suggested by defendant, as Simmons confinns.
At the scene of the crime, the witnesses matched defendant's picture to someone they had
seen minutes before. They made it a point to look at his face when he got out of the car and took

off. It was a strong identification, tantamount to a situation where the police would have brought
him back a few minutes later and asked, "is this the guy?" The Court cannot see an
unconstitutional risk of taint. Under the facts of this case, defendant's theory would require
virtually any prior look at a suspect to be deemed unreliable and an identification-tainting
occurrence.

C. THE PHOTO LINEUP
The above analysis largely renders moot defendant's argument that the initial witness
photo identification tainted the subsequent photo lineup. The on-scene identification was
characterized by non-ambiguity and strength of the identification.
However, following filing of his motion to suppress, defendant raised another issue
attacking the reliability of the photo lineup itself. The Court will thus address whether the photo
array was unreliable. It is not clear to the Court why there was a need for photo lineup, ten
months after the event, when there were already strong eyewitness identifications. The Court in
any event is inclined to exclude the photo lineup at trial because it is cumulative to much

stronger identifications.
However, defendant now argues that the pretrial photo identification procedure used by
Officer Huff was impermissibly suggestive in its own right, even without reference to the photo
4

identification at the scene, and will taint any in-court identification by the witnesses. Thus, the
Court will evaluate the impact of the lineup in light of all the surrounding circumstances to see if
the photo array emphasized defendant's photo over the others, State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, •
1111 (Utah 1994) Lopez, and whether the witnesses have been poisoned beyond repair as a result.
Regarding the lineup itself, as noted, the trial court is the gatekeeper to determine whether
identification information is sufficient to be presented to the jury. State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,
130, 48 P.3d 953, 963. See also State v. Guzman, 2004 UT App 211, 118, 95 P.3d 302,307.
The Court must determine, given the totality of the circumstances, whether a pretrial photo
identification procedure used by law enforcement was ''so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." State v. Lopez, 886 P .2d 1105,
1111 (Uta 1994) (quoting State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d432, 435 (Utahl 989) (citing Simmons v.

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968))). If the photo array was impennissibly suggestive, a
subsequent in-court identification may still be admissible, but it "must be based on (an] untainted,
independent foundation to be reliable." Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1111 (quoting Thamer, 777 P.2d at
435.
Although defendant has an Hispanic surname, like many people of Latino ancestry he is
fairly light complected. The photos Huff assembled were all photos of males with light
complexions, although three appear lighter than defendant. Defendant has a goatee, although it is
not clear whether he had a goatee on the day of the crime.

He is balding. Three of the other

photographed males had goatees, the other two appear to have some facial hair and four out of the
five are balding. Defendant's photo was neither first nor last in the group. Defendant is the only
one wearing a "wife-beater" shirt, to use the vernacular of his generation, but the others have on a
variety of shirts, including one with a white t-shirt. Defendant's shirt is not a reason to single him
out-it is just different but all the other candidates' shirts are different. This is not the safest lineup
the Court has ever seen. However, while not all in the photographs had characteristics identical to
defendant, the Court cannot say the lineup was impermissibly suggestive.
Even if it was impermissibly suggestive, the Court concludes in-court identifications by
the two witnesses will not only have an untainted independent foundation for reliability, as
discussed in the strength of the on-scene identifications described ante, but a strong foundation as

5

outlined above. Those identifications at the scene may be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay
rule under Rule 801(d)(l)(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as well. (See also, State v. Vazquez,
451 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1969). Still, as noted, the Court is inclined to exclude the photo
identification lineup itself as cumulative and unnecessary given the strength of the other
eyewitness evidence and the name identification by defendant's confederate at the scene under a
variety of evidentiary rules.
WHEREFORE IT IS ORDERED: The Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification is
denied. However, the photo lineup evidence will likely be excluded at trial as cumulative,

although it will be necessary for the Court to evaluate it in light of the other evidence actually
presented.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2014.
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